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CHAPTER 14 
Land Use Planning Law 
JULIAN J. D'AGOSTINE and RICHARD G. HUBER 
A. ZONING 
§14.1. Spot zoning and fioating zones: Validity. Land use controls 
involve two contradictory public policies that are in a state of constant 
friction: the necessity of flexibility to meet specific problems conflicts 
nearly always with the necessity of avoiding administrative license. 
The trend of American zoning law has been more toward the English 
standard of substantial administrative discretion controlled by careful 
regulations as to adequate procedural due process in the form of public 
notice and public hearings, but the general American enabling act 
requirement that zoning provisions be "in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan" has tended to make some types of flexible zoning of very 
questionable validity. One such type is the "floating zone." These 
zones are set out in the zoning ordinance but are not applied to any 
specific land until some time later when, in accordance with certain 
standards, the landownerl applies for assignment of this zone to his 
property. It is then granted by the administrative body if the land 
complies with the statutory requirements and if the body in its limited 
discretion so determines. 
Noonan v. Moulton,2 decided during the 1965 SURVEy'year, approved 
something not too dissimilar from a floating zone. The town of Need-
ham had, in 1961, voted seven articles of its town meeting warrant, 
the sum of which authorized for the first time an apartment district 
under the zoning by-law. The eighth article, which would have as-
signed this district designation to a specific area, was, however, de-
feated. In 1962, at the following year's town meeting, the meeting 
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§14.1. 1 Of course, the landowner would be the one most interested in obtaining 
a desirable floating zone designation but there is no reason why the governmental 
unit or the administrative body could not initiate the zone change. The major ob-
jection, however, is based upon the fact that ordinarily those with private interests 
in the land would initiate the requests for the designation. 
21965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 897, 204 N.E.2d 897. also noted in §14.1lI infra. 
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adopted a warrant assigning the apartment house designation to the 
locus. Thus, between March, 1961, and March, 1962, the town's zoning 
by-law included a provision for an apartment zone without any land 
being so districted. 
The Supreme Judicial Court concluded, however, that the 1961 
amendments to the zoning by-law could not "with any proper regard 
for accuracy be said to create a floating zone." In a sense the Court 
may here be dealing with semantics rather than substance, since the 
term "floating zone" carries with it connotations of invalidity. But, 
beyond this, the Court was merely pointing out that the new amend-
ments creating this zone district were each valid when passed by the 
town meeting and that no condition subsequent as to their validity 
required the adoption of the article actually assigning specific land to 
the district. As is obvious, unless a zoning ordinance and a zoning map 
are adopted at the same instant, there will always be a time when a 
zone legally exists but has not been yet applied to any specific land. 
The difference in the present case from the usual example is thus 
merely one of time. 
The Court also specifically pointed out what is sometimes forgotten, 
that the Massachusetts enabling act does not require a comprehensive 
plan.3 Thus the usual objection to "floating zones," that they constitute 
the very antithesis of the legally required preplanning of municipal 
development, has no statutory or constitutional basis in Massachusetts. 
Whether a floating zone is ordinarily desirable as a matter of planning 
itself is another matter; it will be good or bad planning depending 
upon the circumstances in individual cases. Certainly if, despite the 
Court's rejection of the term, the Needham by-law could be considered 
to create a floating zone, it was on its facts wise planning translated 
into zoning law. 
A more conventional but ever serious issue was also involved in the 
Noonan case, that of whether the assignment of the apartment house 
district designation to a relatively small area in 1962 constituted spot 
zoning. The Court had earlier during the 1965 SURVEY year, in Lanner 
v. Board of Appeals of Tewksbury,4 restated its standards in spot zoning 
cases. These principles as stated may be roughly summarized in several 
sentences. While a court will not substitute its judgment for that of 
the legislative body, the latter may not amend the zoning law to confer 
an economic benefit upon the owner of a comparatively small area. 
A valid amendment must substantially relate to the furtherance of one 
of the general objects of the enabling act, chief among which is the 
promotion of the public welfare.1> 
3 See Town of Granby v. Landry, 341 Mass. 443, 445, 170 N.E.2d 364 (1960), noted 
in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.12. 
41964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1381, 202 N.E.2d 777. 
Ii The opinion was written in the usual context of spot zoning by an amendment 
but it is, of course, possible to create such zones by a totally new zoning ordinance 
or by-law. Atherton v. Building Inspector of Bourne, 343 Mass. 284, 178 N.E.2d 
285 (1961), nQted in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.l. 
2
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In the Lanner case the Court found that substantial changes in con-
ditions in the town and relative to the area rezoned justified the amend-
ment as being for the general welfare. Once this was established, the 
Court noted, the local legislative body's determination of the location 
and size of the locus to be rezoned is final, at least if not unreasonable. 
In Lanner the town was shifting from rural to suburban and had had 
only one small area zoned as a business district, originally designated 
in 1947. It was reasonable and wise for the town to plan for its expan-
sion and small business districts, convenient to areas being built up 
for residences, were legislatively proper. The fact that the owner of the 
relatively small locus being rezoned obtained an economic advantage 
over other nearby landowners was not pertinent, so long as the major 
purpose was enhancement of the public welfare. 
The facts in the Noonan case, by which a 1962 article in the warrant 
assigned an apartment designation to land in a single residence district, 
could have, as compared to Lanner, more debatably been held to con-
stitute spot zoning. But, although all nearby areas were zoned single-
family residential, the locus was bounded by an access road to Route 
128, a parochial school and church, a flood plain district adjoining the 
Charles River, and a street upon which faced the buildings of a private 
school, some institutional and some residential. The Court found that 
the land surrounding the locus, which was not itself rezoned, was not 
similar land "indistinguishable from it in character." It reversed the 
portion of the lower court's decree that held invalid the 1962 assign-
ment of the apartment house designation to the locus. 
Two other 1965 SURVEY year cases also involved spot zoning issues. 
In Rousseau v. Building Inspector of Framingham,6 a triangular locus, 
originally zoned residential, which was bounded by a business district 
to the south, an industrial district to the west, and residential districts 
to north and northeast, was rezoned for business use. The Court found 
the reasonableness of the rezoning was fairly debatable and thus sus-
tained it. 
Muto v. City of Springfield7 involved a rezoning from Residence A 
to Residence C zone, in the latter of which apartment buildings of 
considerable height were permitted. The zoning ordinance had been 
adopted in 1923 and the locus faced a street that had shifted from high 
class residential to more mixed uses, including a seminary, convalescent 
home, and dormitory. The locus also abutted on a Residence C district. 
Across from the property, on a side street, the Red Cross had a sizable 
commercial-type building. The Court certainly, upon these facts, was 
correct in finding rezoning was justified. The more difficult issue, how-
ever, was the rezoning only of the locus, whereas other basically similar 
properties in the area were not rezoned. The Court, admitting the case 
was only narrowly differentiated from cases wherein reclassification 
had been held invalid, upheld the lower court's determination that 
the locus's particular location in relation to other nonresidential uses 
6 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 599, 206 N.E.2d !l99. See also §§14.8, 14.16 infra. 
7 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1115, 209 N.E.2d !l19. 
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in the area and with respect to a side road made it distinct froM other 
nearby properties within the zone. 
The four spot zoning cases decided during this 1965 SURVEY year, in 
all of which rezoning was sustained, suggest that the Court is being 
very cautious about possible overturning of local rezoning of even small 
areas. This policy is on the whole wise. Zoning can - and has - be-
come a strait jacket too often, and changes in condition and develop-
ment patterns have not been reflected by changes in zoning laws. The 
result can be that zoning inhibits rather than encourages healthy 
growth of communities. While ad hoc changes in zones may well be 
undesirable, the detailed and public steps now required in the amend-
ment process tend to prevent ill-considered rezoning.s It is thus be-
coming possible for the courts to accept rezoning more readily when 
the process of rezoning insures adequate public discussion and legis-
lative consideration. 
§14.2. Exemption from zoning regulations: Retroactive applica-
tion. Section 7 A of General Laws, Chapter 40A, was added to the 
zoning enabling act to provide a "freeze" period of exemption from 
the application of new zoning regulations when, at the time of the 
rezoning, the locus was part of an approved subdivision.1 In Building 
Inspector of Acton v. Board of Appeals of Acton2 the determinative 
issue was whether an amendment to Section 7 A lengthening to five 
years the time interval between plan submission and actual building 
upon the locus operated retroactively to reactivate the exemption for 
a locus that had lost it under the three-year period that was effective 
earlier. 
A subdivision plan was approved on September 23, 1957.3 At the 
time of the approval the locus was zoned residential and two-family 
residences were permitted in the zone. In 1960 the zoning by-law was 
amended to prohibit two-family residences in a residential zone. Under 
Section 7A, as effective in 1960, a three-year period was the prescribed 
maximum between plan approval and building if the benefits of the 
sections were to be obtained. In 1961, however, an amendment to 
Section 7A lengthened the period from three to five years.4 The owner 
sought and obtained from the Building Inspector permits to build 
two-family houses on lots in the subdivision, the permits being sought 
within five years after the approval of the plan.1i The Board of Ap-
S C.L., c. 4OA, §6, as amended by Acts of 1962, cc. 201, !l2'i, Acts of 1961, c. 151, 
Acts of 1959, c. 377. 
§14.2. 1 Several amendments now protect land under some circumstances when 
only the preliminary plan under the subdivision control law has been submitted. 
C.L., c. 41, §81S. 
21965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 195, 204 N.E.2d 296. 
8 There was a real issue as to whether this approval was invalid because of pro-
cedural deficiencies, but the Court did not have to reach this issue under its 
grounds for decision. 
4 Acts of 1961, c. 435, §2. 
Ii Under the local by-law the board of selectmeJ1 voted to issue the permits, which 
the Building Inspector then did. 
4
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peals reversed, rescinding the permits, but the Superior Court annulled 
the Board's decision and validated the permits. Upon appeal to the 
Supreme Judicial Court, the lower court's decree was reversed and the 
decision of the Board of Appeals reinstated. 
The Court rather summarily rejected the argument that the 1961 
amendment to Section 7A reinstated the exemption retroactively. It 
cited a number of cases in which it has held it would not apply legisla-
tion retroactively to affect substantive rights, unless the statutory lan-
guage clearly requires that result. The Court's determination of this 
issue is supported by precedent but, as the petitioners' brief notes, the 
change from three to five years seems to have been intended to express 
a general policy vesting a less restrictive use of the land.6 A little more 
care in the draftsmanship of the 1961 amendment would have caused 
the Court to reach the result undoubtedly desired by the legislature.7 
The present holding, sound though it is on precedent, does create an 
unwarranted distinction between properties whose only differences 
are the dates of entry into the subdivision control process. 
§14.3. Equal protection of the laws: Posting bond on appeal. In 
Begley v. Board of Appeal of Boston,! the constitutionality of Section 
18 of the old Boston zoning law was challenged.2 This statute sets 
out the procedure for appealing from a zoning decision of the Board 
of Appeals of Boston and requires "the person applying for the 
review ... " to "file a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by 
the court, for such a sum· as shall be fixed by the court. . . ." 
The Boston Board of Appeal had granted an extension of commer-
cial stores into an area where such stores were previously not permitted. 
The plaintiffs, by means of the procedure specified in Section 19 of 
the Boston zoning law,3 appealed to the Superior Court sitting in 
equity. The court determined that a $15,000 bond should be posted. 
The plaintiffs excepted to this order, and the court entered a final 
decree dismissing the plaintiffs' bill on the ground that they failed 
to file the bond prior to the required date. The plaintiffs appealed 
from this decree, contending that the bond requirement imposed on 
them violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution. The basis for this claim is that 
General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 21,4 which permits appeals to the 
Superior Court from the boards of appeals of cities and towns other 
than Boston, contains no such bond provision. The Supreme Judicial 
Court affirmed the lower court decree. 
6 Brief for Petitioners, p. 11. 
7 House No. 3944, rejected by the Senate on June 14, 1965, was a bill designed 
to limit the result of the 1965 amendment, Act of 1965, c. 366, by restoring the 
rule of this case, changed by the act as adopted. See §14.19 infra. 
§14.3. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1091, 208 N.E.2d 799, also noted in §11.9 supra. 
2 Acts of 1924, c. 488, §19, as amended through Acts of 1941, c. 373, §18. Since 
January I, 1965, the new Boston zoning law has been effective. 
3 Ibid. 
4 As amended through Acts of 1960, c. 365. 
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In cases involving the constitutionality of statutes, there is a strong 
presumption of validity.1i One who challenges a statute's validity, on 
the ground that it deprives him of equal protection of the law, has 
the burden of showing there is no reasonable basis to support the 
legislative classification.6 The plaintiffs' only claim was that they 
failed to see the justification for making it more difficult for a Boston 
aggrieved person to take an appeal from a decision of the Board of 
Appeal than for such a person in some other Massachusetts community 
to appeal a decision of his local board. Varying treatment of similar 
problems in different communities, however, is not precluded by the 
equal protection clause if the legislature reasonably believes that such 
treatment is desirable in the public interest.7 Boston is frequently the 
object of special legislation on the reasonable legislative conclusion 
that the largest city in the Commonwealth "may be subject to prob-
lems and conditions not found in comparable degrees in other com-
munities."8 The Court felt that the legislature could reasonably 
determine that the number of frivolous or vexatious appeals from the 
Boston board would be considerably higher than the number of such 
appeals in other cities and towns, and that therefore a bond require-
ment in connection with Boston zoning appeals would be reasonable. 
Although the Court seemed on this point to delve into mere specula-
tion as to legislative purpose, nevertheless the plaintiffs' failure to 
overcome the presumption of constitutionality required the result. The 
plaintiffs failed to show there were no reasonable grounds for the 
classification and their case thus also failed.9 
§14.4. Government immunity: Extent. An essential government 
function, being performed by the Commonwealth or one of its agencies, 
cannot be prevented or prohibited by enforcement of local zoning 
laws.! In Village on the Hill, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Author-
ity,2 a case whose major eminent domain issues are discussed else-
where,a the plaintiff brought a mandamus action against the Boston 
building commissioner seeking to have him enforce the residential 
zoning requirement applicable to the premises upon which a factory 
was being built. 
The premises were located on land owned by the l\1assachusetts 
Ii Commonwealth v. Ferris, 305 Mass. 233, 235, 25 N.E.2d 378, 380 (1940). 
6 Old Colony Railroad Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 309 Mass. 439, 449, 35 N.E.2d 
246, 253 (1941). 
7 Opinion of the Justices, 341 Mass. 760, 781, 168 N.E.2d 858, 871 (1961). 
8Id. at 782-783, 168 N.E.2d at 872. 
9 Justice Whittemore, in dissent, noted his disagreement not with the classifica-
tion involved in the statute but with what he considered the excessive size of the 
bond, which at $15,000 was certainly much more than could possibly be used for 
court costs. 
§14.4. ! See City of Medford v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., 344 Mass. 50, 181 N.E.2d 
584 (1962), discussed in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.5. 
21964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1245,202 N.E.2d 602, also deciding the present case entitled 
Village on the Hill, Inc. v. Building Commissioner of Boston. See also §1l.8 supra. 
a See §14.24 infra. 
6
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Turnpike Authority. The land had originally been in two units, one 
owned by the Boston and Albany Railroad and the other owned by 
the plaintiff. That part of the premises formerly owned by the plaintiff 
was zoned residential under the Boston zoning law.4 The Authority 
and Rivett Lathe &: Grinder Co. had entered into a contract for the 
sale of the premises to Rivett for purposes of building a new plant 
to replace an older one taken by the Authority. At the time of the 
action, although Rivett had substantially completed the building and 
although the building permit had been issued to Rivett rather than to 
the Authority, the Authority still owned the land. 
The Supreme Judicial Court found that the Authority'S functions 
are sufficiently governmental in character so that they are exempt from 
local zoning. But this did o<;)t mean that land in excess of the 
Authority'S turnpike needs, even though owned by the Authority, is 
exempt from local zoning. The Court reversed the lower court's 
contrary finding and thus held the trial judge should have ordered the 
commissioner to enforce the zoning regulations. 
The Court then noted, however, that mandamus is a discretionary 
writ and the judge could, in determining if he were to grant imme-
diate relief, consider the radical change in the neighborhood that was 
probably wrought by the turnpike. He could well grant a delay so 
that an application for a zoning change or a variance could be con-
sidered. The case was thus reversed and remanded for findings of 
facts that may determine if the discretion of the judge can be exercised 
so as to delay relief. 
§14.5. Lots held separate and apart. In Vassalotti v. Board of Ap-
peals of Sudbury1 the Supreme Judicial Court held that, when three 
contiguous lots were held in 1932 by an owner who did not own any 
other adjoining land, the lots may be considered as a single lot under 
General Laws, Chapter 40, Section 5A. Section 5A exempts certain 
nonconforming lots from the operation of local zoning laws, and was 
applied in this case to exempt the locus from frontage and area require-
ments. The Court further held that, notwithstanding the fact that the 
case was an appeal under General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 21, from 
the denial of a variance by the defendant Board, no variance could 
be granted as it was not necessary. In the interest of avoiding further 
litigation the Court treated the plaintiff's action as a request for 
declaratory relief and ruled that he was entitled to a building permit 
insofar as Section 5A was concerned.2 
§14.6. Violation of building by-laws: Enforcement. In O'Donnell 
v. Board of Appeals of Billerica1 it was held that proteedings, includ-
ing those of the Board of Appeals, under a town building by-law 
4 Acts of 1924, c. 488, as amended. This law has since been superseded. 
§14.5. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 425, 204 N.E.2d 924. 
2 Also involved was a similar section of the local zoning by-law that the Court 
found also would permit the proposed use of the premises. 
§14.6. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 919, 207 N.E.2d 877, also noted in §14.~8 infra. 
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adopted under General Laws, Chapter 143, are not within the pro-
ceedings contemplated under General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 14, 
which is limited to zoning qtatters. The Court further stated that there 
are no constitutional or statutory requirements for hearings and notice 
to abutters of proceedings under a building by-law as distinguished 
from a zoning by-law. In the event an abutter believes that a building 
by-law is being violated, and cannot obtain enforcement from the 
enforcing officer, the remedy is one of mandamus. 
§14.7. Side yard requirements: Interpretation. In Tambone v. 
Board of Appeals of Stoneham1 the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that 
the minimum side yard requirements, where a zone boundary bisects 
a given lot, are measured from the lot line and not from the zone 
boundary line. The Board of Appeals, upon a request for a special 
permit for the plaintiff's apartment house, had interpreted the side 
yard requirement to run from the zoning boundary. As the Court 
noted, this was an unique construction in general and also required 
the word "yard" to have a separate meaning in the side yard section 
of the local by-law, different from its meaning in other sections. 
§14.8. Final report of planning board: Adoption of zoning laws. 
In Rousseau v. Building Inspect01' of Framinghaml certain land was 
rezoned from residential to business. The planning board's final report, 
a prerequisite for adoption under General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 
6, failed to report favorably or unfavorably on the amendment, but 
rather recommended the matter by referred back to them for further 
study.2 The Court held that this recommendation constituted a final 
negative report under Section 6, and upheld the zoning amendment. 
§14.9. Zoning: Education use. In City of Chicopee v. Jakubowski1 
the Court held that the use of a portion of premises in a residential 
zone for the teaching of classes in ceramics was not a school within 
the meaning of the Chicopee zoning law. The Court also found that 
it did not constitute an educational purpose which is public within 
the meaning of General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 2, prohibiting 
restrictions on such use. Even if the ceramics classes were educational 
in the sense of Section 2, a point the Court refused to decide, clearly 
the purpose was not public, and thus not within the statutory exemp-
tion. 
§14.10. Special permits: Improper delegation of authority. In 
Clark v. Board of Appeals of Newburyl the premises were located in 
an agricultural-residential district and were used for commercial 
§14.'7. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 85, 203 N.E.2d 802. See also §l4.1l infra. 
§14.8. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 599, 206 N.E.2d 399. See also §§14.l supra, 14.17 
infra. 
2 The board was making a study of the complete area of which the locus was a 
part, and did not wish to make any recommendations concerning rezoning until 
the study was complete. 
§14.9. 1 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1393, 202 N.E.2d 913. 
§14.I0. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 145, 204 N.E.2d .3 •. 
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purposes prior to the adoption of the local zoning by-laws. The New-
bury by-law provided that the selectmen have the authority to permit 
commercial or industrial structures, but that no permits would be 
granted until a public hearing had been held by the selectmen and 
it had been established that the proposed business or industrial use 
was for the best interest of the town and not injurious or obnoxious 
to the neighboring properties. 
The property owner in the present case applied for a permit to put 
an addition onto the nonconforming use for a doctor's office. The 
zoning by-laws had no provision for the extension of a nonconforming 
use. The selectmen granted the permit under the by-law provision and 
the Board of Appeals upheld the action. The Superior Court annulled 
the decision of the Board. Upon appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court 
held that the by-law violated Section 4 of General Laws, Chapter 40A, 
governing the granting of exceptions and special permits under zoning 
by-laws. The Newbury by-law was an improper delegation of authority 
and failed to designate sufficiently precise standards, thereby giving the 
selectmen the invalid power to indulge in spot zoning. 
A case involving a similar situation was Cooke v. Board of Appeal 
of Lowell,2 which held that a zoning by-law authorizing the Board 
of Appeal to grant special permits for the extension of pre-existing, 
nonconforming uses was invalid, since the by-law failed to set forth 
standards that would serve as a guide in the awarding of the permits. 
§14.1l. Special permits: Standards. In Lombard v. Board of Ap-
peal of WeUesley1 the property owner built her home in 1937 with 
a narrow, one-car garage, which accommodated the cars of that era 
but not modern cars. The by-laws of Wellesley authorized a special 
permit for the widening of the garage into the restricted side yard 
area. The majority of the Board favored her petition to widen the 
garage, which would encroach only 18 inches into the 20-foot side yard 
area. As a unanimous vote was required under Chapter 40A, however, 
the petition was denied. Upon appeal under Section 21 of General 
Laws, Chapter 40A, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the denial 
of the requested special permit was arbitrary and capricious, and 
ordered the permit to issue. 
In Tambone v. Board of Appeal of Stoneham2 the zoning law of 
Stoneham allowed the Board to grant a special permit for the exten-
sion of a building or use into a more restricted district if in its judg-
ment the public welfare will be substantially served. The plaintiff 
requested a permit to extend parking facilities into a more restricted 
zone, but the permit was refused by the Board. The Court agreed with 
the Superior Court that the Board's denial was based on a misconcep-
tion of the by-law requirements and sustained the annulment granted 
below. The majority of the Court sent the case back to the Board for 
21965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 478, 205 N.E.2d 848. 
§14.ll. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 255, 204 N.E.2d 471. 
21965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 85, 208 N.E.2d 802. See also §14.7 supra. 
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consideration of issues not mentioned in the Board's earlier decision, 
although Justice Spiegel considered that the Board should be ordered 
to grant the permit. 
In Rando v. Board of Appeals of Bedford3 the town zoning law 
stated that one must obtain a special permit from the Board of Appeals 
for the following business activities in business zones: "filling station, 
garage or storage of automobiles." The Court ruled that a "car wash" 
is a garage within the meaning of the by-law and, therefore, must 
obtain a permit from the Board. 
§14.12. Variances. In Chater v. Board of Appeals of Milton1 an 
owner applied for a variance to permit the building of residences on 
each of four lots, each being under the required 20,000 square feet in 
area, two being contiguous, and the remaining two being held separate 
and apart. The Board denied the'request for variances and the owner 
appealed the decision to the Superior Court under General Laws, 
Chapter 40A, Section 21. The Superior Court upheld the denial of a 
variance as to the two contiguous lots but annulled the Board deci-
sion as to the two separate -lots and decreed variances for them. The 
Supreme Judicial Court upheld the denial of the variance on the two 
contiguous lots, as they could be combined into one building lot 
that would comply with the zoning by-law. As to the two lots held 
separate and apart, the Court held that one of the lots was buildable 
as it was within the exceptions of the Milton zoning law relating to 
lots laid out prior to by-law adoption. As to the remaining undersize 
lot held separate and apart, the Court found that the lot was not 
buildable under the by-law exception because of the use of part of 
it for widening a private way, so that the lot lines were not the same 
as originally set out. But the Court also held that the Board was in 
error in finding that there was not any evidence of conditions es-
pecially affecting the lot, but not generally affecting the zoning district 
in which the lot was located. The Board of Appeals could have found 
the necessary hardship and lack of substantial detriment to the public 
good and substantial derogation from the intent or purpose of the 
by-law and thus could have granted the variance. The decision of the 
Board as to this lot was therefore annulled and the matter remanded 
to the Board for consideration of the application for a variance. 
§14.13. Procedure: Declaratory relief. In Noonan v. Moulton1 
an abutter instituted proceedings in equity in the Superior Court for 
a declaratory decree, under General Laws, Chapter 231A, as to the 
validity of zoning amendments of the town of Needham. The Court 
held that the Superior Court had jurisdiction and limited Sisters of 
the Holy Cross v. Town of Brookline2 to situations in which the land-
s 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 15, 203 N.E.2d 375. 
§14.l2. 1 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1401, 202 N.E.2d 805. 
§14.l3. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 397, 204 N.E.2d 897, also noted in §14.1 supra. 
2347 Mass. 486, 198 N.E.2d 624 (1964), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§§1l.6, 14.5. 
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owner is petitioning for a determination of the zoning law as it applies 
to his own land, in which case the Land Court has exclusive jurisdic-
tion. As to the objection that the zoning law created an "apartment 
district" in 1961 and did not assign any specific land to said district 
until a town meeting in 1962, the Court held this did not create a 
"floating zone" and was a proper exercise of zoning power. 
In Woods v. City of NewtonS abutters to an area rezoned by a vote 
of the board of aldermen, contending the vote was invalid, instituted 
suit in the Superior Court for declaratory relief under General Laws, 
Chapter 231A. The bill alleged that the owner had filed or intended 
to file for a permit to construct a motor hotel on the rezoned premises. 
The defendants demurred contending that the bill did not set forth 
that an actual controversy had arisen, as is required under Section 
1 of General Laws, Chapter 231A. The Court further limited Sisters 
of the Holy Cross v. Town of Brookline' by stating that the grant of 
exclusive jurisdiction to the Land Court is limited not only to cases 
in which the property owner is the petitioner but also to those cases 
in which there is no actual controversy in the usual acceptation of 
that term. A landowner, therefore, in cases in which an actual con-
troversy exists, may institute proceedings for declaratory relief either 
in the Land Court or in Superior Court under General Laws, Chapter 
231A. The Court remanded the case to the Superior Court so that the 
plaintiffs could amend and obtain a trial on the substantive issues. 
Justices Spiegel and Kirk concurred with the result reached by the 
majority, but strongly dissented to that part of the dictum of the 
majority that confined Sisters of the Holy Cross to cases in which there 
is no actual controversy, on· grounds that to limit the case further 
would add confusion rather than clarification to the law, and emas-
culated the holding of the earlier case. 
In Town of Stow v. Pugsleyrl the town brought a bill for declaratory 
relief under General Laws, Chapter 231A, alleging that a controversy 
existed because the respondent Pugsley was constructing a cement 
building for use as a motor vehicle repair garage, and seeking a 
determination whether this use violated both the Stow general and 
zoning by-laws. Subsequent to the filing of the bill, four abutters 
instituted mandamus proceedings against the selectmen to enforce 
the by-law. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the bill for 
declaratory relief was properly instituted and that the mandamus 
petition should be abated. The town had asked to be instructed 
whether there were violations of the by-laws and had already invoked 
the enforcing power given to the Superior Court by General Laws, 
Chapter 40A, Section 22, so mandamus to seek the enforcement was 
redundant. 
In Bob Ware's Food Shops, Inc. v. Town of Brookline,o a corpora-
S 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 989, 208 N.E.2d 508. 
'347 Mass. 486, 198 N.E.2d 624 (1964). 
rl 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 925, 207 N.E.2d 908. 
o 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1001, 208 N.E.2d 505. 
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tion owning land adjoining a municipally operated off-street parking 
area sought declaratory relief under General Laws, Chapter 231A, to 
determine the validity of the town's action in adopting warrantsrela-
tive to the acquisition of additional land, including the petitioner's, 
for an extension of the parking area. The Supreme Judicial Court 
sustained the dismissal of the bill. Among other grounds, the petitioner 
sought to establish that the action would cause a violation of the 
town's zoning and building laws upon land adjoining the petitioner's. 
The Court stated that the corporation, being at most an abutter, had 
to allege (presumably to constitute a controversy) a request to the 
appropriate town officials to enforce the by-law and their refusal or 
failure to do so, as this is a necessary condition precedent to relief 
even to a person owning land abutting on land alleged to be used 
in violation of zoning by-laws. The Court further held that, even if 
relief could have been granted, the owners of the adjoining lots should 
have been joined as parties, citing General Laws, Chapter 231A, 
Section 8. 
§14.14. Procedure on appeal: Mandamus. In Dresser v. Inspector 
of Buildings of Southbridge,1 it was held that mandamus would lie to 
enforce a zoning by-law although the petitioners did not appeal the 
granting of the building permit several years earlier. The Court stated 
that mandamus proceedings are in the general public interest to en-
force the public right; however, in the present case, where the property 
owner was not made a party, no direct enforcing order could issue. In 
issuing the writ of mandamus, the Court held that the existence of a 
zoning violation will be an issue in equity enforcement. proceedings 
brought by the town under General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 22. 
§14.15. Procedure on appeal: Person aggrieved by decision of 
building inspector. In Brady v. Board of Appeals of Westport,1 a 
property owner sent a letter to the building inspector complaining 
that an abutter's activities were in violation of the town zoning law. 
The town counsel replied to the letter advising that such use was not 
in violation and that the town would take no action. The property 
owner appealed to the Board of Appeals and, receiving an unfavorable 
decision, appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the Board 
of Appeals. The Supreme Judicial Court, in sustaining the Superior 
Court, held that certain procedural difficulties exist in the enforcement 
of a zoning by-law, and the normal course of action when the zoning 
law is not enforced is mandamus. The Court held, however, that in 
the case at bar the town counsel's letter constituted a decision in the 
sense it is used in General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 13, and that 
the property owner's appeal was proper although he also had the 
right to bring mandamus. 
§14.16. Procedure on appeal: Notice to clerk. In Maria v. Board 
§14.l4. 1 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 513, 205 N.E.2d 724. 
§14.15. 1 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 271. 204 N.E.2d 513. 
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of Appeal of Lowell,l the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the 
Superior Court was without jurisdiction to hear an appeal under 
General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 21, where the plaintiff failed 
to give notice to the city clerk of his bill in equity within twenty days 
of the filing of the Board's decision with the clerk. The Court cited 
Lincoln v. Board of Appeals of Framingham,2 in which it clearly 
called attention to the necessity of specifically following the provisions 
of Section 21. 
Another question of proper procedure was involved in Halko v. 
Board of Appeals of Billerica,S in which the required town clerk's 
certificate, accompanying the copy of the Board of Appeal's decision, 
which is attached to the bill in equity, was undated. The Court held 
that the Superior Court was not deprived of jurisdiction as the facts 
clearly required the finding that the bill was filed and notice of the 
same given and received by the town clerk, all within the required 
twenty-day period. It was further held that the failure to include 
the addresses of the defendants was not a jurisdictional defect, espe-
cially where the affidavit as to notice was filed within the required 
twenty-one days of the filing of the bill in equity and listed the correct 
addresses of the defendants to whom the required notices were sent. 
§14.17. Procedure on appeal: Notice to owners of property. In 
Rousseau v. Building Inspector of Framingham1 the Court held that 
in hearings before the board of appeals, under General Laws, Chapter 
40A, the notice provisions of Section 17 as to mailing notice to the 
petitioner and to the owners of all property deemed to be affected 
thereby, require reasonable notice be given. The Court stated that had 
the legislature intended fourteen days' notice in mailing, as in the 
case of publishing, it would have so stated. In the present case, how-
ever, four days' notice by mail was held unreasonable, notwithstanding 
the fact that the party was present at the hearing. The party did not 
have opportunity to prepare his opposition, but the Court avoided 
the question as to the number of days necessary to constitute reason-
able notice. It is suggested that consideration be given to amending 
Section 17 to establish a fixed time prior to a hearing for the mailing 
of these notices. 
§14.18. Costs of appeal. In Bouchard v. Ramos} which had been 
previously before the Court,2 the plaintiff was held not entitled under 
Section 21 of General Laws, Chapter 40A, to costs. Costs cannot be 
granted against a board of appeals unless it appears that the board 
acted with gross negligence, in bad faith, or with malice, or against 
§14.l6. 1 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 589, 206 N.E.2d 94. 
2346 Mass. 418, 193 N.E.2d 590 (1963), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.4. 
81965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1099, 209 N.E.2d 323. 
§14.17. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 599, 206 N.E.2d 399, also noted in §§14.1, 14.8 
supra. ' 
§14.18. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 9, 203 N.E.2d 678. 
2346 Mass. 423, 193 N.E.2d 691 (1963). 
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the party appealing from a decision unless the appeal was made in 
bad faith or with malice. 
§14.19. Legislation. Chapter 63 of the Acts of 1965 amended 
General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 4, to require boards of appeals, 
selectmen, or city councils, when acting to consider a request for a 
special permit, to comply with the notice requirements of Section 17 
and to hold a public hearing. Other requirements of Sections 18 
through 21, governing board of appeals' procedures, will also govern 
action by city councils and selectmen. 
Chapter 65 of Acts of 1965 amended Section 7A of General Laws, 
Chapter 40A, so as to grant the "freeze period" to disapproved sub-
divisions, provided a timely appeal from such disapproval is taken and 
it complies with the applicable provisions of the subdivision control 
law. 
Chapter 366 of the Acts of 1965 further amended Section 7A so as 
to extend the "five-year freeze period" to seven years. Section 2 of the 
act provides that the provisions of Section 7 A shall apply to plans 
submitted prior to this amendment's effective date, thereby making the 
freeze period retroactive. The effect is to change the rule of Building 
Inspector of Acton v. Board of Appeals of Acton} which had held the 
original section did not have the effect of reactivating the freeze 
period when it was lengthened after the original shorter period had 
run.2 
B. SUBDIVISION CONTROL 
§14.20. Failure to notify town clerk within sixty days. In Board 
of Selectmen of Pembroke v. R. &- P. Realty Corp.} a definitive sub-
division was submitted to the planning board who, within sixty days 
after submission, approved the plan subject to eight conditions. The 
board failed, however, to send the sixty-day notice of its decision as 
required by General Laws, Chapter 41, Section 81U, to the town clerk 
until sixty-six days after the submission of the plan. The petitioner, 
acting under Section 81V of General Laws, Chapter 41, requested a 
certificate from the town clerk of "constructive approval" by virtue of 
the planning board's failure to give notice of its final action under 
the provisions of Section 81 U to the town clerk within sixty days of 
the filing of the plan. The clerk's certificate was issued and recorded 
in the registry of deeds. The certificate also set forth that no notice 
of appeal was received within the twenty days prescribed by Section 
81BB of~neral Laws, Chapter 41. The Supreme Judicial Court held 
that th{failure of the planning board to give notice within the sixty-
day penod constituted constructive approval of the plan in its sub-
mitted form, thus giving it the status of an approved plan. The decision 
of the Court went on to state, however, that the planning board is 
§14.19. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 195, 204 N.E.2d 296. 
2 The case is discussed in more detail in §14.2 supra. 
§14.20. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1267, 202 N.E.2d 409, also discussed in §U.7 supra. 
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not without relief, as under the provisions of Section 81W (on its own 
motion or the motion of any other interested party) it may modify, 
amend, or rescind its approval. However, this action cannot be taken 
as against lots which have been sold or mortgaged for a valuable 
consideration subsequent to the approval of plans, without the consent 
of the owner or mortgagee . 
. §14.21. Approval of plan: Conditions imposed by planning board. 
In Ellen M. Gifford Sheltering Home Corp. v. Board of Appeals of 
Wayland1 a subdivision was duly approved by the planning board of 
Wayland, in which it imposed as a condition that only one dwelling 
should be erected on each of Lots 11 and 12. Shortly thereafter, the 
by-laws of the town were amended to require a special permit from 
the Board of Appeals for the building of charitable buildings in single-
residence districts. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that, notwith-
standing the fact that ordinarily under the provisions of General Laws, 
Chapter 40A, Section 7 A, the zoning applicable at the time of the 
subdivision's approval is controlling (which would have authorized the 
construction of a structure to house 150 or 200 cats), this proposition 
is limited by any conditions imposed by the planning board upon 
approval of the plan. Furthermore, in the absence of an appeal within 
the statutory period, these conditions imposed under General Laws, 
Chapter 41, Sections 81Q and 81R, are deemed reasonable and proper. 
The petitioner had, therefore, to comply with the limitation of build-
ings to single-family residences. 
§14.22. Legislation. Chapter 61 of the Acts of 1965 amended Sec-
tion 81L of General Laws, Chapter 41, to alter slightly the definition 
of "subdivision." Exemption from control because each lot has front-
age upon a way shown in an approved subdivision plan was further 
qualified to require not only approval but endorsement. It may be 
questioned whether a subdivision approved by default under Section 
81 U, with the appropriate town clerk's certificate, constitutes an 
endorsement within the new statutory language. 
Chapter 62 of the Acts of 1965 amended Section 81U of General 
Laws, Chapter 41, to require, as to completion of the construction of 
ways, installation of municipal services, or performance of a covenant, 
that the applicant send the written statement by registered mail not 
only to the town clerk, as was previously required, but also to the 
planning board. 
Chapter 64 of the Acts of 1965 amended Section 81Q of General 
Laws, Chapter 41, to require specific statutory notices of the public 
hearing held by a planning board before adopting or amending its 
rules and regulations. The general requirement of "due notice" has 
been changed to a fourteen-day minimum period with two newspaper 
notices or, if there is no newspaper in the community, by public 
posting in the city or town hall at least fourteen days before the 
hearing. 
§I4.21. 11965 Mall. Ady. Sh. 885,208 N.E.2d 207. 
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c. EMINENT DOMAIN 
§14.23. Taking or regulation. In Commissioner of National Re-
sources v. S. Volpe & CO.l the Supreme Judicial Court had to deter-
mine if a conservation condition imposed by the plaintiff Commissioner 
and the Director of Natural Resources constituted a taking of the 
defendant corporation's land for which it would be entitled to com-
pensation. The corporation had purchased a large part of Broad 
Marsh in Wareham and, in accordance with General Laws, Chapter 
130, Section 27A, gave notice of its intent to dredge. It intended to fill 
the marsh and to use a dredged channel, basin, and marina to furnish 
boating and water rights to lot owners. After proper hearings, the 
director accepted the proposal for dredging the channel and basin 
but imposed the condition that no fill be placed in the marsh so as to 
protect the food supply of the nearby marine fisheries. 
The Court recognized that the vital question was whether the 
condition, imposing as it did a requirement that prevented reasonable 
residential development of the marsh area, constituted a taking with-
out compensation. It noted the analogy to the various zoning cases 
that have held invalid regulations that deprive a landowner of the 
use of his property without any countervailing public benefit.2 The 
Court also discussed New Jersey and Connecticut cases finding that lim-
its placed upon land uses for flood control purposes constituted upon 
their facts a taking of property without compensation, and finally 
quoted from the famous - or perhaps infamous -opinion of Justice 
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.8 
The issue then became one of fact. The president of the defendant 
corporation testified that fill was necessary to carry out the project he 
proposed. But this, of course, did not determine whether there was 
"such a deprivation of the practical uses of the marsh as to be 
equivalent to a taking without compensation." The plaintiffs' con-
tentions that conservation measures must be supported as valid regula-
tions had to be rejected by the Court. No matter how important or 
vital a public purpose may be, carrying out this purpose in such a 
way that a landowner's property is permanently restricted from any 
reasonable use constitutes a taking and is not mere regulation.4 
The Court remanded the case for the taking of further evidence and 
for further findings on some eight pertinent factors. The Court also 
listed five issues that should be developed in briefs and oral arguments 
upon any subsequent appeal to the Court. This listing of factual and 
§14.2~. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 671, 206 N.E.2d 666, also noted in §11.2 supra. 
2 The Court cited, among others, the leading case of Barney &: Carey Co. v. Town 
of Milton, ~24 Mass. 440, 87 N.E.2d 9 (1949), as well as the most recent case in this 
area, Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 846 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d lHl (1964), noted in 
1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.l. 
8260 U.S. ~9~, 415-416, 4~ Sup. Ct. 158, 160, 67 L. Ed. ~22, ~26 (1922). Mr. Justice 
Brandeis dissented. 
4 The Court quoted the leading case of Arveme Bay Construction Co. v. 
Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 282, 15 N.E.2d 587, 591-592 (1938), on this point. 
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legal issues seems to be unique among the Court's opinions and con· 
stitutes a desirable practice when issues are complicated and the Court 
wishes to be certain all issues it considers pertinent will be argued 
without further delay and remand. It may be added that the lists of 
the factual and legal issues are precise and complete and will aid the 
parties and the lower court greatly in their further handling of the 
case. This opinion writing technique, although sometimes used by the 
United States Supreme Court, has been only seldom used by the state 
courts. It offers, however, an efficient means of expediting a final deci-
sion in complicated cases and the Supreme Judicial Court deserves 
congratulations for adopting it. 
In order to deal with the problem of preservation of unspoiled salt 
marshes, the Governor sent a message proposing legislation to regulate 
and control them.1S House Bill No. 3861 was reported as a slight 
modification of the Governor's bill and, as of the date of this writing, 
seems assured of passage. This bill proposes, in the exercise of police 
power, to restrict dredging, filling, removing, polluting, or otherwise 
altering coastal wetlands. In order to restrict an area under the bill, 
the Department of Conservation must: (a) hold a public hearing in 
the community where a restriction has been proposed; (b) record the 
written order, setting forth the restrictions and reasons therefor, a 
list of the lands restricted, and the names of the assessed owners as 
listed in the most recent records; and (c) mail a copy of the order to 
each assessed owner. 
No person will be able to use the restricted coastal wetlands contrary 
to the order, and the Superior Court sitting in equity will have juris-
diction to restrain a violation. An owner of restricted land will be able 
to recover compensation if he files an action in the Superior Court 
within two years from the date of the recording of the restriction 
order, and if the order is deemed by the court to constitute a taking. 
In view of the decision in Commissioner of Natural Resources v. 
S. Volpe & Co., discussed above in this section, this procedure will help 
assure that the designation of restricted wetlands will be carefully 
considered but that the regular systematic approach required by the 
bill will assure the desired protection. In a number of cases it is 
probable that compensation will be required to be paid but the 
importance of the conservation involved makes these expenditures 
fully desirable. 
§14.24. Public purpose. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. 
S. Volpe & CO.,l discussed immediately above, also involved a second 
issue perennial in eminent domain as well as many other cases. In 
this case the lower court had determined that the Commissioner's 
powers under General Laws, Chapter 130, Section 27A, to impose 
conditions to protect shellfish and marine fisheries constituted an exer-
cise of a valid public purpose. The correctness of this decision was too 
IS House No. 3861 (1965). 
§14.24. 1 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 671, 206 N.E.2d 666. 
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obvious to require any discussion. by the Supreme Judicial Court. The 
public purpose issue did, however, arise in two other cases, and in at 
least one of which the question was a close one. 
In Village on the Hill, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority2 
the Authority had taken land owned by Rivett Lathe & Grinder Co. 
(Rivett). In the course of negotiation Rivett and the Authority agreed 
that Rivett could purchase as a site for its new plant a portion of the 
Faneuil Dump area which the Authority had the power to purchase 
under its contract with the Boston and Albany Railroad. Engineering 
studies revealed, however, that a present road would most desirably 
have to be relocated in such a way that it would require part of the 
land originally planned for Rivett's new plant as well as some land of 
the plaintiff, Village on the Hill, Inc. (Village). Further negotiation 
led to a contract between Rivett and the Authority by which a new 
location for the Rivett plant was settled upon, a substantial part of 
which was on land taken from Village but which was now between 
the relocated street and Village's remaining property. 
The lower court found that the engineering study resulting in the 
street relocation and the consequent taking of the land that was 
afterward the subject of the contract of sale to Rivett was done upon 
sound engineering principles and was not done to assist Rivett. It 
also found that the Authority did not take Village's land for the 
purpose of sale or lease to Rivett, and thus did not under the guise 
of public need deprive Village of its property to turn it over to Rivett 
for its private purpose. This decree was affirmed by the Supreme 
Judicial Court. 
The general rule as to public purpose in the Massachusetts decisions 
requires that the public purpose must predominate over any private 
purpose if the action involved is to be considered constitutionally 
valid.3 The Court found this requirement not overly difficult to meet 
on the facts of the present case. The Authority had the right to pro-
vide access to that part of the Faneuil Dump area which would other-
wise have no access to highways after the turnpike was built. The 
Authority could sell excess land in the Faneuil Dump area and provide 
it with substantial access. Its judgment as to the location of that access 
would not be disturbed by the Court when the facts indicated it was 
a reasonable engineering decision. The action of selling the excess 
land to Rivett was a valid "by-product" of the public purpose of 
turnpike construction. 
The issue of public purpose is constitutional, but taking authorities 
do not necessarily have the right to exercise eminent domain powers 
to their constitutional limits. The enabling act authorizing the 
Authority to build the turnpike gave it the power to take land, in the 
21964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1245, 202 N.E.2d 602, zoning aspects of which are discussed 
in §14,4 supra. 
3 See, e.g., 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.22; 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§1O.2, 
U.S. 
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name of a city or town~ to change the location of a public highway.' 
In the present case, however, the authority had· not obtained the 
approval of the state Department of Public Works, which would be 
required if the relocation were considered that of a public way. But 
the Court noted that the Department's approval is not, under the 
statute, a condition precedent to the relocation and that it could 
now be obtained. 
If the Authority treated the relocation as being of a private way, 
the Department would not have to approve the relocation, but the 
statute did not authorize the Authority to take under these circum-
stances in the name of the city. The Court dismissed this objection, 
stating that the Authority could have taken the land for a private way 
directly in its own name and then transferred it to the city to layout 
as a public way. Thus the Authority did in one step what it could 
clearly have done, technically more correctly, in two steps. The Court 
then left it to the Authority to obtain department approval of the 
whole way or to obtain city approval to layout the formerly private 
way section of the street as a public way. 
In an Opinion of the justicesf5 the Justices determined that payment 
to the holders of retired alcoholic beverage licenses was for a valid 
public purpose. The proposed legislation was designed to meet the 
difficult problem raised by the necessity of reducing the number of 
Boston licenses. The need for reduction was created largely by renewal 
projects under the Boston Redevelopment Authority but also in part 
was the result of population reduction in the center city over the past 
twenty years. 
The Court, while stating that a liquor license is revocable at the 
pleasure of the granting authority, realistically noted that it does have 
an economic value. The Court found one public purpose in the reduc-
tion of establishments which, when excess in number, tend for com-
petitive reasons to become nuisances or near nuisances. As to payments 
to individual licensees, the Court accepted the analogies of the emi-
nent domain cases. The legislature can and does grant eminent domain 
damages in some situations in which damages are not constitutionally 
required but in which the owner would suffer substantial hardship 
if he were deprived of compensation. The legislature, if it decides that 
the loss of a liquor license may create a moral obligation on the state, 
can, if it wishes, compensate the licensee. 
While this opinion dealt with expenditur~ of public funds rather 
than the taking power, the practical closeness of the retirement of a 
license to a taking of property makes the opinion a valuable precedent 
in the eminent domain area. 
§14.25. Taking agencies: Conflicts and co-operation. When one 
agency takes, or wishes to take, property owned by another agency 
that is being used for public purposes, seeds of conflict exist. Several 
4 Acts of 1952. c. 554. §7. as amended by Acts of 1958. c. 584. 
51965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1057. 208 N.E.2d 821$. 
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cases and statutes dealt with various aspects of these problems during 
the 1965 SURVEY year. 
In its opinion in Commonwealth v. Massachusetts Turnpike 
Authorityl the Supreme Judicial Court decided two cases. The first 
case was a bill in equity to have the Authority's taking of the Irvington 
Street Armory in Boston declared void. As the armory had been 
demolished prior to any decision in this case, the Commonwealth 
filed its second suit for assessment of damages under General Laws, 
Chapter 79. A jury verdict of $895,000 was returned. After the decision 
of Massachusetts Turnpike Authority v. Commonwealth,2 the Author-
ity unsuccessfully filed a motion to dismiss the present damages suit 
on the ground that General Laws, Chapter 79, does not apply to 
public land taken for highway purposes. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that, upon the rather special 
facts of the case, the Authority's taking of the Commonwealth's 
armory was valid. In an earlier case with the same name as the 
present case,s the Court had held that the Authority's general power 
to acquire "by . . . eminent domain . . . such public lands . . . as it 
may deem necessary,"4 did not constitute a blanket authorization 
to take land being used for other public purposes. But even if the 
original taking of the armory may have been invalid under this 
principle, the taking was ratified by the General Court in a 1962 act 
that indicated how the funds received from the Authority for the 
armory were to be expended./i 
The Court, however, upheld the Commonwealth's contention that 
it was entitled to full and complete compensation under General Laws, 
Chapter 79. It is settled law that land owned by a municipality in its 
public capacity can be taken by the General Court without any 
obligation to pay.6 Thus, with the armory being held by the Common-
wealth in its public, as opposed to private, proprietary capacity, the 
right to compensation depended upon the statutes. The Court, quoting 
Chief Justice Shaw's opinion in Commonwealth v. Boston & Maine 
R.R.,7 found that a specific and affirmative statutory statement to the 
effect that state land was to be given without any obligation to pay 
was required if liability for damages was to be avoided. The statute 
creating the Authority8 evidences the legislative intentions that the 
§14.25. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 557, 206 N.E.2d 74. 
2347 Mass. 524, 199 N.E.2d 175 (1964), discussed in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§14.24. 
S 346 Mass. 250, 191 N.E.2d 481 (1963), discussed in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§13.l5. 
4 Acts of 1952, c. 354, §5(k). 
I) Acts of 1962, c. 717, §l. 
6 The Court quoted from City of Worcester v. Commonwealth, 345 Mass. 99, 185 
N.E.2d 633 (1962), noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.15, for this established 
proposition. 
7 3 Cush. 25, 43 (Mass. 1849). The Court noted that, in the present case, the fact 
that the taker was a public authority rather than a private railroad did not affect 
the applicability of the Shaw rationale. 
S Acts of 1952, c. 354. 
20
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1965 [1965], Art. 17
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1965/iss1/17
204 1965 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §14.25 
turnpike is to be financed by borrowing, that it shall become the 
property of the Commonwealth when its debts are paid, and the 
Commonwealth is to bear no direct part of the costs. Clearly, there-
fore, this statute failed to make the necessary affirmative statement 
that no compensation need be paid.9 
The Court then distinguished its language in its earlier opinion, 
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority v. Commonwealth,IO in which it 
held that a taking by the Commonwealth of land of the Authority 
did not entitle the latter to compensation. While certain language of 
this opinion was ambiguous on the issue of Authority liability for 
damages, the Court readily and correctly found it inapplicable to the 
actual case now before it. 
The main permanent importance of this opinion and its two imme-
diate predecessors with the same parties may well be to suggest that 
a general legislative solution of these intergovernmental conflicts be 
enacted. This solution would then be applicable unequivocally unless 
precise language evidencing a contrary intent was adopted in specific 
legislation. 
The second case involving intergovernmental conflict, The Trustees 
of Reservations v. Town of Stockbridgep involved rather narrow 
points of law. The town sought to attain for a school site certain 
property owned by the trustees. The General Court, in Acts of 1963, 
Chapter 824, authorized the town to acquire the specific land "by 
purchase or otherwise," in accordance with a town meeting vote. 
Despite ingenious and persuasive arguments for the trustees, the 
Court accepted the legislative decision as final and declared the taking 
valid. The most controversial aspect of the case involves not the 
Court's decision but the act of the legislature in permitting the taking 
of land that has scenic and historic interest to the public. At a time 
when most persons and agencies are pointing out the nation's vital 
interest in retaining and rebuilding amenities in urban areas, it may 
seem a bit contradictory to have the General Court take property from 
the trustees who are devoting it to what is not only a popular but 
seemingly an essential use if urban life is to remain livable. 
Two statutes of a local nature adopted during the 1965 SURVEY year 
reveal that the General Court will in most cases consider the retention 
of amenities and open spaces sufficiently important to require legisla-
tive support. In Acts of 1965, Chapter 353, damages to be paid the 
city of Springfield for taking a section of a park are to be used only 
for improvement of the recreation facilities of the park. In Acts of 
1965, Chapter 51, the compensation for the taking of a portion of park 
land for a police and fire station is required to be used for acquisition 
of additional park land or for creation of a park from land already 
9 The Authority's argument was not perhaps as weak as the opinion might sug-
gest. See Reply Brief of the Defendant, pp. 4-6. But the Court's opinion seems to 
be the best reading of a somewhat doubtful legislative intent. 
10347 Mass. 524, 199 N.E.2d 175 (1964); 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.24. 
11 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 265, 204 N.E.2d 463. 
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owned by the town. The legislature indicated some doubts as to the 
validity of the latter course of action, stating ". . . if such use is 
determined to be lawful by a court of competent jurisdiction." 
§14.26. Damages: Entitlement and admissible evidence. The most 
common issue in eminent domain cases is the amount of damages the 
taker must pay. Several cases arising during the 1965 SURVEY year 
dealt with various aspects of damages issues. 
LaCroix v. Commonwealth l involved an application of General 
Laws, Chapter 81, Section 7C, which entitles a landowner to special 
damages when he is deprived of his access to a public way because 
a limited access highway has been built. If this section does not apply 
on given facts, a landowner is remitted to his right to damages under 
General Laws, Chapter 79, Section 12, which gives damages for access 
loss only to the extent that the loss is special and peculiar to the 
landowner and is not a general loss by the public at large.2 
In LaCroix the Authority took a small corner of the land owned by 
the plaintiff but also, by taking other land nearby, cut off LaCroix's 
ready access over his frontage road to a major road somewhat to the 
south of his locus. Instead of a direct route of a quarter mile LaCroix 
now had to travel three or four miles to reach the same point on this 
major way. But, the Court noted, the actual way abutting LaCroix's 
premises was not touched and his access to this local way was un-
impaired. The only problem was that this local way was terminated 
at the new highway's edge instead of continuing on to join the major 
route some hundreds of feet beyond. The Court read Section 7C 
narrowly but correctly as limiting these extraordinary damages to 
instances in which there was a loss of access to the public way, and not 
merely an increase in difficulty in attaining the way. In LaCroix, the 
landowner had exactly the same access to exactly the same way after, 
as he did before, the taking. Thus the lower court had erred in apply-
ing Section 7C to these facts. 
Despite the correctness of the Court's application of the statutory 
language, one may well wonder if the Massachusetts rule limiting 
recovery for loss of access is a sound one under present conditions. 
While a state must be careful to avoid overcompensating individuals, 
it is even more grossly unfair to require individual landowners, who, 
as in the present case, have suffered a serious reduction in property 
value, to bear a large and very disproportionate share of the costs of 
a public improvement. The present rules governing damages are 
often not sufficiently sophisticated to make compensation realistic. 
Even in those situations in which the damages rules are adequate, 
questions often arise as to what evidence is properly admissible to 
prove the damages. The general rule leaves a great amount of dis-
cretion in the trial judge, and his decision will be supported even 
§14.26. 1 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 419, 205 N.E.2d 228. 
2 See Tassinari v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 347 Mass. 222, 197 N.E.2d 
584 (1964), discussed in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.25. 
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though the Supreme Judicial Court assumes that a contrary ruling on 
the admissibility would also have been supportable. Thus in Boyd v. 
Law1'ence Redevelopment A uthority3 the Court sustained a ruling by 
the trial judge that testimony concerning the sale of the adjoining 
tract was inadmissible, although it assumed that the judge could also 
properly have admitted the testimony. The more difficult issue in the 
Boyd case, however, involved the admission by the trial judge of 
evidence about sales of four parcels of industrial property in the 
Lawrence area, although the four parcels were substantially smaller 
and somewhat further out from the city center. The Court noted there 
was adequate evidence that there was little vacant industrial land in 
the Lawrence area and that the industrial use of the premises would 
have involved small plants, so that differences in sizes of the plots were 
unimportant.· Thus the sales evidence and the expert's opinion based 
upon it were highly relevant and therefore admissible. Differences 
between the locus and the four parcels would go only to the weight 
to be given the value evidence, not to its admissibility. 
In Gregori v. City of Springfieldo the trial judge had admitted evi-
dence of the sale price of adjoining land. The locus was in a Residence 
B zone but the adjoining land was sold contingent upon its being 
rezoned to Residence C, which had been done. The Court overruled 
exceptions to the admission of this evidence, noting that differences 
in zone classifications of property do not require a rejection of value 
evidence as inadmissible. Clearly the zone difference is a factor the 
judge should consider in determining if the value evidence relates 
to sufficiently comparable property to be useful. But, just as with any 
other difference between a locus and property claimed to be compar-
able, a zoning difference does not require a flat ruling of inadmis-
sibility. This was further supported by the fact that the judge fully 
instructed the jury upon the effect of zoning regulations on com-
parable sales evidence. 
In Paradys% v. Commonwealth6 the Court, in rescript opinion, up-
held the lower court's rulings admitting evidence concerning sales 
of lands claimed to be comparable to the locus. A more interesting 
and perhaps controversial rescript opinion, however, is Sinoyan v. 
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.7 The petitioner, who owned a 
"bowladrome" that was taken by the respondent Authority, sought to 
prove damages by showing the building's reproduction cost less the 
depreciation that had occurred. When there are no sales that are 
adequately comparable, value must be proven by other techniques. 
81964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1219, 202 N.E.2d 297. 
4 A similar consideration was involved in Consolini v. Commonwealth. !l46 Mass. 
501, 194 N.E.2d 407 (1963), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.26. In Canso-
lini the Court held it error not to have admitted evidence of sales of dissimilarly 
sized plots when there was no plottage factor. 
51965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 127. 204 N.E.2d 113. 
61964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1433. 202 N.E.2d 795. 
71964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1456. 205 N.E.2d 580. 
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As to certain types of property held exclusively for investment, value 
can be estimated with fair accuracy under a capitalization of income 
method. But some properties are sufficiently unique so that compar-
able sales are essentially impossible to find and income factors are not 
crucial in determining value. Whether a bowladrome is unique in 
this sense will be debatable but the lower court, sustained by the 
Supreme Judicial Court, held this valuation technique appropriate. 
The lower court had admitted evidence of the gross receipts of the 
bowladrome business for the two years prior to taking. Admission 
was upheld by the Supreme Judicial Court, upon the authority of 
City of Revere v. Revere Construction Co.S That case had permitted 
the introduction of evidence of net profits in determining property 
values in cases in which the profits of a business depend primarily 
upon its location rather than the business acumen of the entrepreneur. 
The gross receipts evidence of Sinoyan would seem, if combined with 
other business experience statistics, to relate as well as net profits to 
determining value upon the basis of reproduction costs less deprecia-
tion. It would seem, however, to indicate also that the capitalization 
of income technique of valuation could have been used upon the 
facts of the case. Generally, this technique will give a valuation esti-
mate of higher quality and greater accuracy than will the technique 
of using reproduction costs less depreciation. 
The Court also sustained the admission of evidence of maintenance 
carried out by the bowladrome owner. Since this would relate directly 
to depreciation, the Court, once it had accepted the reproduction cost 
less depreciation method of setting value, correctly upheld the lower 
court's rulings. On the question of whether the alleys were part of the 
realty or separate personalty, the lower court had correctly left this, 
upon proper instructions, to the jury. Thus evidence of alley mainten-
ance was also properly admitted. 
The confusion and difficulties in the proof of value in eminent 
domain cases would suggest that some techniques be developed to 
simplify the proof process while perhaps improving its accuracy. 
Chapter 8 of the Resolves of 1965 sent House Bill No. 2496 to the 
Judicial Council for study. This bill would amend General Laws, 
Chapter 233, by inserting a new section dealing with the introduction 
of evidence of the sale price of comparable property in eminent 
domain cases. Under subsection (a), the sales price or other relevant 
circumstances surrounding the transfer of comparable property will 
no longer be inadmissible by reason of its hearsay nature, provided 
that the party seeking to introduce such evidence furnishes the op-
posing party, at least sixty days before the trial, with a list of such 
of these transfers as he intends to introduce. Any objection to this 
evidence will be heard by the trial judge without the jury, and it 
will be entirely within his discretion whether to allow it in. The 
passage of this subsection would mean added convenience and lack of 
S 285 Mass. 243. 248-250. 189 N.E. 73. 75-76 (1934). 
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delay in the trial of eminent domain cases. Instead of requiring. four 
or five actual participants of comparable sales to testify at the trial, 
a single source could present the facts and figures of all the compar-
able sales. Less time would be required for the trial, and there would 
be fewer continuances because of unavailability of witnesses. 
Subsection (b) of the bill would require all witnesses for either 
party, who are expressing opinions as to the value of a parcel based 
in whole or in part upon transfers of similar property in which sale 
they did not participate as principal or agent, to follow the notice 
provisions of subsection (a). This does not add anything significant to 
the substantive law of evidence in eminent domain cases. It will, how-
ever, remove the possibility of surprise as to what comparable parcels 
are going to be used by an expert witness. It will require attorneys 
preparing for trial to engage their experts, and require the experts to, 
in effect, prepare their opinions considerably befor~ trial. The net 
result, however, would seem to be a simpler and more orderly trial 
without any loss of availability of pertinent evidence. 
§14.27. Procedures: Protection of those affected by a taking. The 
extensive additions to General Laws, Chapter 79, made by Acts of 1964, 
Chapter 579, were designed to protect those who suffer hardship when 
land is taken, but the legislation created some problems.1 Despite 
some rather obvious difficulties the only remedial act passed as of 
the date of this writing is Acts of 1965, Chapter 573. The 1964 legisla. 
tion had, in a new Section 7D of General Laws, Chapter 79, made 
provision for the taking authority in certain cases to pay the com· 
pensation to the Justices of the Superior Court, giving the Justices 
the discretion to permit deposit of the fund. Serious doubt arose 
about the feasibility of this section, since the Justices were not designed 
to be and were probably not interested in becoming a type of collection 
agency. The discretion lodged in the Justices to accept or reject the 
petition of deposit, with no alternative in case the petition was refused, 
created doubts whether the section would work. Some of the problems 
of the section were solved by the adoption of a revised Section 7D 
under Acts of 1965, Chapter 573. The damages are made payable not 
to the Justices of the Superior Court but to the Superior Court of 
the appropriate county. The petition for deposit is no longer dis-
cretionary and the court is required to direct the investment or deposit 
of the fund. The court in which the petition is brought, rather than 
the Justices generally, retains control over the fund. The revision also 
added a provision assuring that this section would not conflict with 
Section 16 of the chapter, which sets out the prescriptive periods for 
actions for compensation. The section still involves two difficult prob-
lems that the amendment does not solve. Someone must first of all 
make the decision that there is some defect so that no one is in a pay-
able position. The taker cannot bind the courts on this, so in cases 
of doubt the Superior Court will have to decide. In close cases this 
§14.27. 1 See comments in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.27. 
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should, of course, be the rule, but many cases are likely to go to court 
when only a bit of imagination would indicate the legal result. The 
second objection reflects on the cost of this process. It seems horribly 
expensive in cases in which awards are relatively small. 
Acts of 1964, Chapter 633, Section I, inserted a new Section 8B in 
General Laws, Chapter 79, requiring a taking body to give four 
months' notice to certain persons before requiring them to vacate the 
property.2 Those entitled to notice were those whose property was 
taken or who were otherwise entitled to damages under General Laws, 
Chapter 79, Section 7C. Acts of 1965, Chapter 468, added a new 
paragraph to Section 8B, requiring the taking authority to give four 
months' notice to tenants and lessees in possession of property taken, 
if they are being used for residential or business purposes. The amend. 
ment seems salutary, although it will create administrative problems 
for taking authorities who may well find it difficult in some cases to 
give the requisite notice. Four months is a fairly long delay. and any 
further delay caused by difficulties in notifying those entitled under 
this amendment could create unacceptable limitations on the progress 
of some types of public improvements. The statute does, however, 
permit alternative service by certified mail, or by leaving the written 
notice at the usual place of abode or at the portion of the property 
taken which is used for residential or business purposes. If these 
methods can be used alternatively to personal service, without any 
necessity of attempting to locate the tenant, the delay will be minimal 
and should be fully acceptable to taking authorities. 
A bill adopted as Chapter 653 of the Acts of 1965 involves the 
interest payable on compensation awards.s House Bill No. 3957, 
reported as Senate No. llN, is designed to permit the taking authority 
a thirty-day grace period in which to pay a damages award without 
being liable for interest. The procedure for payment of highway 
awards, for example, requires the clerk of the Superior Court to 
forward to the Comptroller a certificate of judgment, showing the 
amount owing by the Commonwealth. The Comptroller forwards this 
information to the Department of Public Works, which obtains the 
necessary releases, apportionment agreements, and any other documents 
required, and forwards these and its invoice to the Governor and 
Council for approval. The Governor, upon approval, draws his warrant 
and the Treasurer issues his check. The bill is designed to encourage 
the most prompt possible carrying out of this rather involved process 
since doing it within thirty days relieves the award of interest, but if 
the award is not paid within thirty days, interest commences as of the 
date of entry of the judgment. 
Numerous bills to alter various aspects of eminent domain procedure 
2 The 1964 act is noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.28. 
S Acts of 1964. c. 548. §2. made interest payable by the Commonwealth at the 
rate of 6 per cent. The Commonwealth was not. prior to this time. liable for inter-
est on awards against it. See General Electric Co. v. Commonwealth. 829 Mass. 661. 
llO N.E.2d 101 (1958). 
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and to limit or regulate it were filed. As of the date of this writing 
many were still somewhere in the legislative process. The existence of 
such a number of bills would suggest that the time has come for a 
fairly exhaustive study of the eminent domain law of the Common-
wealth. 
§14.28. Federal standards for taking procedures. For some time 
the Select Subcommittee on Real Property Acquisition of the Commit-
tee on Public Works of the U.S. House of Representatives has been 
making extensive studies of the impact and effect of eminent domain 
procedures in the various federal and federal-assisted programs. The 
study is now largely complete and several of the subcommittee's recom-
mendations were adopted in the Housing and Urban Development Act 
of 1965.1 
In order to receive federal assistance in connection with urban 
renewal, public housing, urban mass transportation, public facility 
loans, open space land, basic public works, neighborhood facilities, and 
advance land acquisition, the applicant must comply with the following 
policies in connection with the acquisition of real property by eminent 
domain: 
(1) the applicant must make every reasonable effort to acquire the 
property by negotiated purchase; 
(2) no owner shall be required to surrender possession before the 
applicant pays to the owner either the agreed purchase price arrived 
at by negotiation or, in any case where only the amount of the payment 
to the owner is in dispute, not less than 75 percent of the appraised 
fair value of such property as approved by the applicant; 
(3) the construction or development of any public improvements 
should be scheduled so that no lawful occupant of the real property 
involved shall be required to move without at least a ninety-day written 
notice from the applicant. 
§14.29. Air ~ights. The desirability of using the air rights above 
public uses of the surface of land, such as roads and parking spaces, has 
led to the adoption of various statutes within the Commonwealth.1 
Several new ones were adopted during the 1965 SURVEY year. Acts of 
1965, Chapter 446, extended the time within which the Massachusetts 
Turnpike Authority can lease air rights over the Boston extension 
from 1966 until 1969. Most takers should show up by then. Uniquely, 
Acts of 1965, Chapter 262, amended General Laws, Chapter 172, Sec-
tion 55(A)(4), to permit trust companies to invest in mortgage loans of 
leasehold interests created under the Massachusetts Turnpike Author-
ity enabling act. 
The city of Boston's power to construct and maintain bus terminals 
was amended by Acts of 1965, Chapter 218, to include the right to 
§14.28. 1 Pub. L. 89-117 of Aug. 10, 1965. The amendments to eminent domain 
procedures are included in Title IV of the statute, §§401-404. 
§14.29. 1 Some of the statutes and underlying legal issues are discussed in 1962 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.25 and 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.14. 
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lease air rights above public off-street parking facilities in the govern-. 
ment center renewal project area. Acts of 1965, Chapter 342, further 
amended the section in its bus terminal provisions, but did not affect 
the earlier air rights amendment. 
A bill seeking authority for the state Department of Public Works 
to lease air rights over state highways was still in the legislative process 
at the time of this writing. 
§14.30. Relocation. Various proposals, as well as one statute, 
relating to relocation payments and assistance have been noted in these 
pages before.1 As of the date of this writing, none of the numerous 
proposals before the General Court this SURVEY year has advanced to 
enactment. Governor Volpe submitted a message that included a bill 
authorizing a Bureau of Relocation in the state Department of Com-
merce and Development.2 This bill is equivalent to others introduced 
during the session.s Numerous other bills, some destined for lingering 
but inevitable death but others with an excellent chance for enact-
ment, are also before the General Court. All this ferment suggests that 
the present provisions are inadequate and that a comprehensive and 
civilized system of relocation should be adopted. The problem is not 
only and no longer a question of justice to displaced individuals, since 
one need not be a cynic to realize that government can - as it must at 
times - ignore some injustice to the individual if the general public 
sufficiently benefits. But one need have no more than a casual con-
sciousness of communication media to realize that failure to solve 
relocation problems may well bring entire public programs to a com-
plete standstill. This far from remote possibility will hopefully insure 
the enactment soon of some progressive and adequate relocation sys-
tem. 
D. URBAN RENEWAL AND HOUSING 
§14.31. Constitutional and statutory issues: Judicial review. Elec-
tronics Corporation of America v. City Council of Cambridge1 in-
volved the selection of the Kendall Square Industrial Area in the city 
of Cambridge for the proposed site of the National Aeronautical and 
Space Administration (NASA) center. Of the ninety-four business con-
cerns in the area, twenty-seven brought a bill in equity for both injunc-
tive and declaratory relief against several defendants, including the 
city, the city council, the city manager, and the Cambridge Redevelop-
ment Authority. The declaratory relief prayed for was a determination 
that the area did not constitute a valid subject for an urban renewal 
project under General Laws, Chapter 121. Injunctive relief was sought 
to stop advancement of the project during pendency of the suit, and 
§14.30. 11964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.28; 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.13. 
2 Senate No. 1030. 
S House No. 3803, with the same provisions as Senate No. 1030, is based upon 
House Nos. 860, 2409, and 2748. 
§14.3I. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 323, 204 N.E.2d 707, also noted in §§ll.ll, 13.2 
supra. 
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a permanent injunction was prayed for to stop any urban renewal 
project in the area. The lower court sustained four demurrers to the 
plaintiffs' claim, and before proceeding further, reported the case to the 
Supreme Judicial Court for a determination of the interlocutory de-
crees. The Court affirmed the lower court and sustained the demurrers. 
On September 30, 1964, the Cambridge Redevelopment Authority 
adopted a resolution that the area was appropriate for an urban re-
newal project under General Laws, Chapter 121. This resolution was 
adopted by the city council and approved by the city manager. Under 
General Laws, Chapter 121, Section 26QQ,2 a redevelopment authority 
has the same "functions, rights, powers, privileges and immunities" as 
a housing authority. A housing authority, under General Laws, Chapter 
121, Section 26P(b),3 has the power to determine the areas within its 
jurisdiction which "constitute sub-standard, decadent or blighted open 
areas and to prepare plans for clearance thereof." Substandard is de-
fined in General Laws, Chapter 121, Section 26J, as "an area wherein 
dwellings predominate which by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, 
... lack of ... sanitation facilities, ... are detrimental to safety, 
health, morals, welfare or sound growth of a community." A decadent 
area is defined as detrimental because of the existence of buildings 
which are "out of repair, physically deteriorated. . .. " A blighted 
open area is defined as a predominantly open area which is detrimental 
because "it is unduly costly to develop it soundly through the ordinary 
operations of private enterprise .... " The plaintiffs' bill prayed for 
a ruling that the area is not substandard, nor decadent, nor a blighted 
open area within the definition of General Laws, Chapter 121, Section 
26 J. If this ruling had been made by the Court, the Cambridge Re-
development Authority would have been guilty of designating an area 
as being appropriate for an urban renewal project solely to provide 
a site for NASA. An arbitrary taking of this kind would deprive the 
plaintiffs of their property without due process of law. 
It was pointed out by the Court, however, that under General Laws, 
Chapter 121, Section 26ZZ,4 an urban renewal project cannot be under-
taken until a plan is submitted to the Commonwealth Division of 
Urban and Industrial Renewal, and its approval granted. No approval 
by the division had even been requested. Therefore, the only action 
that had taken place at the time of the case was the adoption of the 
resolution by the Cambridge Authority designating the areas as appro-
priate for urban renewal, and the filing of an application for fed-
eral funds to make surveys and plans in relation to the area. This 
amounted only to the Authority making a study of the area, an action 
clearly within its jurisdiction. Since the Authority has made no attempt 
to proceed under Chapter 121, the Court ruled that there was neither 
any controversy to settle nor any grounds for injunctive relief. If the 
2 As amended by Acts of 1957, c. 150. §1. 
3 As amended by Acts of 1955. c. 640. §2. 
4 As amended by Acts of 1960. c. 776. §6. 
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Authority does act under Chapter 121, and obtains the necessary ap-
proval, the plaintiffs will then have a remedy in the courts. Until then, 
the Supreme Judicial Court refused to substitute its judgment for that 
of the Authority. 
How effective the right of property owners to contest a taking as not 
being proper under the urban renewal statutes may, however, be seri-
ously questioned. The opinion of the majority in Moskow v. Boston 
Redevelopment A uthority5 found that, in five cases brought by land-
owners concerning the taking of their property for an urban renewal 
project, demurrers by the various defendants were properly sustained. 
The cases are complex and the points decided in the opinion are 
numerous. The importance of the case to urban renewal demands, 
however, a brief summary of the most important facts, claims, and 
issues. The plaintiffs, the same persons in all actions, were the owners 
of a building that was one of two in Parcel 8, a portion of the Govern-
ment Center Project in Boston. In the principal bill for declaratory 
relief, it was alleged that the bank defendant, objecting to the taking 
of its State Street principal office, entered into an understanding with 
the Boston Redevelopment Authority and a developer that it would 
withdraw its objections if the plaintiffs' building were purchased and a 
new tower building with the bank as principal tenant were built on 
the land upon which the plaintiffs' office building was then located. 
If purchase by the bank was not possible, the Authority agreed to in-
clude the plaintiffs' property in the renewal area and take it under 
eminent domain, which was done. The bill continued with the history 
of the Government Center Project, including the Boston City Coun-
cil's refusal to approve the project in 1963 because of Parcel 8 and its 
reversal of this decision in 1964 after new council members were 
elected. It was alleged that both at the council hearings and the later 
hearing before the director of the Division of Urban and Industrial 
Renewal the plaintiffs were refused their rights to be represented by 
counsel, to intervene, and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. It 
was also claimed that the plan submitted by the Authority did not, as 
required by General Laws, Chapter 121, Section 26ZZ, conform to a 
Boston general plan nor did it indicate zoning changes required for 
the proposed tower building to be built on Parcel 8. 
The majority of the Supreme Judicial Court, in an opinion by the 
Chief Justice, first eliminated as defendants the bank and one of its 
directors as unnecessary to the discussion of the allegations. The opin-
ion found that the bank, although more than an interested bystander, 
did not have the type of interest required by General Laws, Chapter 
231A, Section 8; i.e., it did not have or claim any interest that would 
be affected by the requested declaratory judgment. On this point, 
Justice Kirk, joined by Justice Spiegel, dissented. They found the alle-
gations raised the issue of whether there was not a taking by a public 
body from one private owner for the benefit of another private owner. 
51965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1203, 210 N.E.2d 699, also noted in §11.8 supra. 
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Thus the dissenters felt that the allegations succeeded in raising the 
issue of whether the taking was for a public purpose, and disagreed 
with the majority on whether the allegations did not come within the 
example of Chief Justice Qua in Despatchers' Cafe Inc. v. Somerville 
Housing Authority.6 The bank director was held not to have any in-
terest that could be affected by the requested declaration. 
The most difficult issue was whether the demurrer had been properly 
sustained in favor of the Boston Redevelopment Authority. The dis-
senters found that the allegations, raising as they did the issue of 
public purpose, could not be determined upon demurrer. The major-
ity, however, found otherwise, by what was a very careful and argu-
ably overly technical reading of the pleadings. Thus the allegations 
that the dissenters found had raised the public purpose issue, the 
majority dismissed as rhetoric unsupported by adequate allegations of 
facts. The administrator, not the Authority itself, was also charged 
with the acts complained of, and the majority did not believe that, 
under normal rules applicable to the interpretation of pleadings upon 
demurrer, the actions of the administrator could be inferred to be 
those of the Authority. 
The numerous objections concerning action of the city council and 
the Division of Urban and Industrial Renewal were essentially re-
jected upon the determination that the decisions of these bodies were 
political and thus legislative. Due process objections based upon de-
nials of rights to intervene and to examine and cross-examine witnesses 
were, therefore, irrelevant. 
Objections based upon the claim that General Laws, Chapter 121, 
Section 26ZZ, requirements for conformity with the general plan and 
inclusion of zoning changes were not met, were summarily rejected. 
There was no showing that a general plan existed for Boston and the 
statutory phrase only meant that, if there was a general plan, the pro-
posed Project Plan had to comply with it. The "zoning change" ob-
jection was rejected as none too clear and at least partly answered by 
the plaintiff's own allegations that the Project Plan showed that the 
permitted height in the zone was 155 feet whereas the proposed tower 
was over 300 feet. 
The companion cases, involving the same parties but seeking relief 
upon different bases - two writs of certiorari, a bill in equity and a 
petition under the State Administrative Procedure Act - were also 
quickly rejected by the Court, largely upon the same substantive 
grounds expressed in relation to the principal bill for declaratory 
relief. The administrative decisions were not "in an adjudicatory pro-
ceeding" under General Laws, Chapter 30A, Sections 1(1), 14, and thus 
APA relief was not obtainable. The Court intimated that the plaintiffs 
8332 Mass. 259, 263, 124 N.E.2d 528, 531 (1955): "It is perhaps possible to imagine 
a case where the authorities ostensibly taking land for a schoolhouse have no in-
tention of building any schoolhouse at all but are really taking the land to let it 
lie open for the benefit of adjoining land owned by themselves or for some other 
irrelevant purpose." 
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had no rights as parties in the bill in equity seeking relief under Gen-
eral Laws, Chapter 268A, Section 21. Section 21 provides the remedy 
of rescission and annulment of municipal action brought about by 
breaches of the statutes regulating the conduct of public officials and 
employees. The issue as to standing did not have to be decided, how-
ever, since the Court had already rejected contentions that certain city 
councilmen had violated the standards set by the statutory code of 
ethics. 
One can sympathize with Justice Kirk's statement in dissent that 
landowners after this decision will find it difficult to gain access to a 
forum to show that a public authority is exercising its power of emi-
nent domain for primarily private purposes. Clearly, however, the 
majority would not agree with this analysis. The demurrers were sus-
tained essentially because the majority did not find the allegations to 
be of a sufficiently factual nature. Other allegations, giving more facts, 
and specifically those facts that relate to illegal acts of the defendants, 
would apparently withstand demurrers. Arguably, however, the ma-
jority might have read the allegations in the present case more sym-
pathetically, thus leaving the determination of even problematical 
issues to trial. 
§14.32. Federal housing and renewal legislation. The Federal 
Housing and Urban Development Act of 19651 has several far-reach-
ing provisions which will have their effect on urban renewal and hous-
ing programs in Massachusetts. The emphasis of the new law is on 
low-income housing. The major innovation is a rent supplement pro-
vision in Title I of the act. This authorizes the administrator of the 
Housing and Home Finance Agency to make an annual payment to a 
housing owner on behalf of qualified tenants. In order to receive pay-
ment the housing owner must be a nonprofit, co-operative, or limited 
dividend organization. The complete operation of the rent supplement 
section calls for new construction to be financed under the Section 221 
low-cost housing program, with interest at regular market rates and 
subject to FHA requirements. Eligible tenants for this housing are 
to be chosen from those families whose income is below the maximum 
set for public housing and who, in addition, are elderly, handicapped, 
displaced from their homes by government action, living in slums, or 
are victims of natural disasters. The selected tenants will then pay 25 
per cent of their income toward the fair market rent established by the 
FHA, with the rent supplement paying the balance of the fair rent. 
This program is expected to generate 375,000 units of low-income 
housing over the next four years. 
The rent supplement provisions, however, only deal with new con-
struction. In order to help alleviate the present demand for low-income 
housing, the so-called Widnall program was passed. This allows exist-
§14.32. 1 Pub. L. 89-117 of Aug. 10, 1965. [Ed. Note: The appropriations for the 
rent supplement program failed to pass the Congress because of apparent doubts 
about the standards imposed by the tentative regulations prepared by the Housing 
and Home Finance Agency.] 
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ing private housing to come into use in the rent supplement program. 
Owners of private housing will be invited to put their buildings on a 
listing kept by the housing authority. Not more than 10 per cent of a 
multifamily structure will be allowed to be used for this low-rent hous-
ing. The local housing authority and the owner will then negotiate 
the rental charge; the owner will select the tenant from among those 
qualified; the owner and the local authority will then agree upon the 
. rent to be paid by the tenant with the balance a supplement by the 
authority. Requirements for maintenance and replacement are estab-
lished and the authority will retain the right to give tenants notice to 
vacate. A contract of this type could run from twelve to thirty-six 
months and could be renewable. The tax exemption feature of the 
public housing program does not apply to this type of housing and 
building owners will pay their regular taxes. 
Two other provisions of the housing act that may have considerable 
effect in Massachusetts are the rehabilitation grants and the beautifica-
tion section. The rehabilitation grants will permit payment of up to 
$1500 to low-income home owners (annual income less than $3000) in 
urban renewal areas, when urban renewal plans require them to make 
repairs. While these grants are part of the renewal project cost they 
are fully federal and require no local matching. This program supple-
ments the special rehabilitation loan program authorized in 1964, 
which program was also liberalized and increased by the 1965 act. 
The beautification and open space provisions call for matching 
grants for such things as street landscaping, park improvements, tree 
planting, upgrading of malls and squares, and the acquisition and 
development of land for recreational, conservation, and other public 
uses. 
A large number of other largely technical changes in the various 
renewal and housing programs were adopted. These include some ex-
tensions and modifications of the public housing programs and the 
use of a flat 3 per cent interest rate for federal loans for several housing 
programs. The urban renewal provisions were subject to numerous 
amendments which cannot be detailed here but are of importance to 
any community involved in the program. Code enforcement provisions 
were substantially changed to authorize grants to the communities 
themselves rather than to the renewal authorities. The proposals for 
support of "New Town" development eventually resulted only in the 
adoption of a mortgage insurance program, but this may lead the way 
in time toward substantial federal financial encouragement of this 
particular solution to urban overcrowding and strangulation. 
§14.33. Low-income housing. Nearly thirty years after public 
housing was first authorized on the federal level, adequate housing 
still does not exist for much of our urban and rural populations. The 
problems of low-income housing have in many states been left to the 
federal government, while the state authorities spend their time com-
plaining of federal encroachment on states' rights. Massachusetts has 
been fortunate, however, in having had a long-time and continued in-
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terest in low-income housing. The continuing urgency of these prob-
lems, combined with the special problem of the housing of Negroes 
and other minority groups, led to the appointment in 1964 of a Special 
Commission on Low Income Housing, the chairman of which was 
Malcolm E. Peabody, Jr., and whose members included distinguished 
legislators and private citizens. The final report of this committee, 
published during the 1965 SURVEY year, reviews the history of housing 
legislation and makes many outstanding suggestions, which in com-
bination would solve much of the Commonwealth's housing problems.1 
No one interested in housing should fail to read this report. 1£ a few of 
the Commission's recommendations are a bit rich for some tastes, the 
pattern of programs proposed provides a superb blueprint for state 
action. Certainly the Commission would itself be the first to welcome 
constructive criticism and new approaches, realizing as it does that its 
solutions are hardly infallible. But the Commonwealth owes the Com-
mission a great debt of gratitude for its dedication and imagination, a 
debt that can best be paid by adopting the Commission's recommen-
dations even if some adoptions were treated as experimental. 
The report cannot be adequately summarized by noting its major 
recommendations, but they will give some idea of the scope and depth 
of the study. In its study of existing programs, the Commission recom-
mended the shift of the veterans' housing programs under Acts of 1946, 
Chapter 372, and General Laws, Chapter 121, Sections 26NN-26PP, to 
low-income housing but with appropriate increases in the state's an-
nual subsidy. An increase in state support of housing programs for the 
elderly is also called for. As to families displaced by public action, the 
Commission recommended that housing authorities be forbidden to 
impose local residency requirements. Its final recommendation as to 
existing programs was the establishment of a study commission to in-
vestigate the problem of the housing of those receiving public welfare 
assistance. 
The Commission's recommendations for new programs reveal the 
desirable combination of common sense and imagination. It recom-
mended the creation of a state housing finance agency to make direct 
mortgage loans for certain types of low- and moderate-income housing. 
A rent supplement program of a complete and sophisticated nature 
was also proposed. A state-aided public housing program, desirably 
designed to avoid the pitfalls that have dogged public housing in the 
past, is one of the best practical reviews that exists of problems and 
solutions in this area. 
To help solve the problems created by the deteriorating housing 
stock in large parts of the Commonwealth's urban areas, the Commis-
sion made four major proposals. The first would create conditions, 
including an insurance fund, to encourage mortgagees and real estate 
investors to come into deteriorating areas and to help rehabilitate 
§14.33. 1 House No. 4040 (1965). A summary report stating in broad strokes the 
major recommendations, entitled "Decent Housing for All," was published in 
March, 1965. 
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them. Half of the personnel costs of code enforcement would be borne 
by the state. Extensive changes recommended in the rights and obliga-
tions of landlords and tenants are designated to encourage adequate 
upkeep of residential properties. The absentee landlord would be re-
quired to appoint an agent for service of process or to have been 
deemed to have appointed the local city or town clerk. In addition the 
Commission proposed a pilot project involving the appointment of a 
housing investigation officer in the Roxbury District Court, to investi-
gate and consult concerning housing, and to aid the judges in dis-
posing of the landlord-tenant cases that come before the court. 
The Commission also recommended an adequate and long-overdue 
relocation program and the appointment of three study commissions 
to cover building code, real estate assessment, and fire insurance prob-
lems. 
If the Commission's program is revolutionary in certain aspects, it 
is so only because the housing problem has become an increasing source 
of interracial and other social conflict. The Los Angeles riots have 
recently again pointed out that housing, of course, represents but one 
aspect of the social problems that lead to violence and discord. Attacks 
on this one source of conflict, however, will do much to alleviate ten-
sions and encourage the solutions of other problems. Many of the 
Commission's recommendations are not particularly radical, because 
they deal with problems of a less urgent nature or are in the process 
of solution. But some problems are so great and so complex that radical 
measures will have to be taken if even more drastic solutions are not 
to be forced upon the governments. The Commission's proposals are 
designed to accomplish an extensive evolution and hopefully avoid 
revolution. 
§14.34. Slum housing. House Bill No. 3685, designated as an 
emergency law, was reported to the House Ways and Means Commit-
. tee on April 7, 1965, and relates to the enforcement of the minimum 
standards of fitness for housing under the state Sanitary Code.1 Section 
I of the bill has five parts: (I) Tenants are to make rental payments 
into court upon a finding by the District Court that a building violates 
the standards of the Sanitary Code, or any local board of health stand-
ards, and if these conditions may materially impair the health of the 
tenant, and if the condition was not substantially caused by the tenant. 
(2) A petition may be filed by any tenant, in the District Court, for a 
nominal fee. At least ten days before filing a petition, however, the 
tenant must give written notice of the alleged violation to the owner 
of record and to the local board of health. If the owner takes no action, 
the petition can be filed and a hearing will be held within fourteen 
days. (3) A certified copy of any state or local enforcement agency in-
vestigation will be admissible evidence and will constitute prima facie 
evidence of the facts stated therein. (4) Upon a finding of a violation, 
§14.34. 1 The bill would add new Sections 128G-128J and amend Sections 5 and 
124 of G.L., c. lIi. 
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the court may order any or all tenants of the building in which the 
violation occurred to pay their rent into the clerk of the court, pro-
viding such tenant is not in arrears on his rent. The court may then 
direct the use of the rental payments held by the clerk in the manner 
which will, in the court's judgment, best effectuate the removal of the 
violation. (5) Any time after thirty days from the date of the court's 
order authorizing rental payments to be paid to the clerk, but before 
final judgment, any party can pay a removal fee of five dollars, and 
the case will be removed to Superior Court for further proceedings as 
if the petition had originally been brought in that court. 
Section 2 of House No. 3685 would allow the local board of health 
or any tenant to file a petition in the Superior Court to force an owner 
to comply with an order of the board which has been unheeded for 
ten days. The court may then (a) issue appropriate restraining orders 
or injunctions; (b) authorize rental payments to the clerk of the court; 
(c) close up said premises; (d) appoint a receiver. 
At the time of this writing, this bill has not yet been reported out 
of committee. 
A further measure was proposed in House No. 3178 to help alleviate 
the problem of enforcing the Sanitary Code against the owners of slum 
housing. This act would require a mortgagor, upon every sale or trans-
fer of real estate, to list or furnish the name of the true owner of prop-
erty, and not merely the owner or mortgagee of record for concealment 
purposes. The provision carries with it a fine for violation. Although 
referred to the next annual session, and so for all practical purposes 
defeated, the legislature will in time have to provide means for identi-
fication of the owners of slum housing in order to enforce Sanitary 
Code provisions. 
Also referred to the next annual session was a bill penalizing a land-
lord who willfully or intentionally fails to provide a service he con-
tracted to provide at a time when such service is necessary to the 
proper or customary use of such building.2 This bill was another aimed 
at the "slum lord" in order to force him to provide heat, hot water, 
gas, and other such utilities and services. 
§14.35. Antidiscrimination legislation. During the 1965 SURVEY 
year, General Laws, Chapter 151B, the antidiscrimination chapter, 
was amended several times.1 In Section 1 a new subsection defined 
commercial space, while Section 4 made it unlawful to discriminate in 
the selling or renting of such commercial space. 
Commercial space is defined as any space in a building structure 
which is used, occupied, arranged, designed, or intended to be used for 
the manufacture, sale, resale, or distribution of personal property; or 
space designed, arranged, or intended to be used as a separate business 
or professional unit. Under Section 4(8), it is now unlawful for the 
owner, lessee, sublessee, or manager of such commercial space to dis-
2 House No. 563 (1965). 
§14.35. 1 Acts of 1965, cc. 213, 569. 
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criminate against any person because of his race, creed, color, or na-
tional origin in the rental, sale, or lease of such commercial property. 
Furthermore, it is unlawful to make any written or oral inquiry into 
the race, creed, color, or national origin of a person seeking to rent, 
lease, or buy any such commercial space. 
Acts of 1965, Chapter 569, amended Section 5 of General Laws, 
Chapter 151B, to permit a petitioner who has been discriminated 
against by any unlawful practice to receive damage of up to one 
thousand dollars in addition to any other action taken. These damages 
could include, but are not limited to, expenses incurred in obtaining 
alternative space, expenses for moving costs, and expenses for storage 
incurred as a result of the unlawful practice. 
Resolves of 1965, Chapter 13, provides for a study by the Judicial 
Council of a bill designed to impose sanctions for inciting racial ten-
sion and fear so as to induce the sale of real estate. The bill is designed 
primarily to discourage the "blockbusting" techniques by which some 
speculators have used artificially created racial tensions to reap large 
financial rewards. 
§14.36. Public housing. In Sullivan v. Fall River Housing Au-
thorityl a tenant sought to prevent a proposed rent increase in the 
defendant's public housing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the 
decree dismissing the bill in equity. The pertinent statute, General 
Laws, Chapter 121, Section 26U, gave to the State Housing Board 
(now the Department of Commerce and Development) the exclusive 
right to bring a bill in equity to enforce the housing law, including 
the rental provisions in General Laws, Chapter 121, Section 26FF. If 
the state agency refused to enforce these rent provisions against the 
local housing authority, a tenant's remedy would be by writ of man-
damus against the state agency. The Court thus rejected the plaintiff's 
argument that denial of his bill in equity would leave him without 
recourse to the courts. 
Retirement rights of certain veterans employed by housing authori-
ties were adopted by Acts of 1965, Chapter 498, amending the provi-
sion of General Laws, Chapter 32, that governs retirement rights of 
those veterans who were employed by government units prior to June 
30, 1939.2 The legislation undoubtedly affects relatively few housing 
authority employees but places them on a par with their peers in local 
government. 
E. OTHER LAND USE MATTERS 
§14.37. Regional planning. During the 1965 SURVEY year, several 
enactments have changed the scope and power of the Metropolitan 
Area Planning Council. Section 114 of General Laws, Chapter 6, was 
amended so as to give the Council the authority to enter into contracts 
and agreements with any division of the federal or state government, 
§14.36. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 523, 205 N.E.2d 701, also noted in §13.9 supra. 
2 Corrective changes were made to the act by Acts of 1965, c. 680. 
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or any private party, in connection with the work of the Council,1 
Services or money consideration may be contributed or received by 
the Couhcil in such contracts and agreements. The amendment further 
provided that the Council may keep and expend such funds, or funds 
received by gift, grant, or agreement from any source, in addition to 
the funds appropriated by the General Court. Formerly, the amount 
of such resources· was deducted from the appropriations made by the 
General Court. 
Section 109 of the General Laws, Chapter 6, was amended to make 
the Commissioner of Natural Resources an ex officio member of the 
Metropolitan Area Planning Counci1.2 This is another step in the 
present process in Massachusetts and throughout the nation for fur-
thering conservation and open space planning. Section III was also 
amended and now specifically lists the cities and towns included in 
the Metropolitan Area Planning District.3 This is a simplified refer-
ence, as opposed to the former referral to those towns making up or 
contingent to the other cities and towns comprising the metropolitan 
sewage, park, or water districts. 
In the area of regional planning, several significant pieces of legisla-
tion were proposed but were not acted upon in this SURVEY year. One 
such proposal was for the General Court to appropriate an amount 
to each district planning commission equal to the amount assessed the 
district.4 This attempt to have the state finance part of the work of the 
district commissions was referred to the next annual session, but is the 
type of legislation that eventually will have to be enacted. A second 
proposal called for the creation of county planning departments, to 
stimulate and develop regional planning.5 In some areas of the United 
States the county is a very logical geographic unit for planning. But 
Massachusetts county lines only accidentally coincide with the type of 
areas requiring regional planning. Regular regional planning districts 
would seem to remain the best solution for the Commonwealth. The 
bill itself was withdrawn. 
A third proposal, presented by Governor Volpe as a result of a meet-
ing of the New England Governors, takes a step in the opposite direc-
tion. This calls for an interstate agency to handle New England re~ 
gional planning.6 This type of program would be of benefit in the 
areas of conservation, tourist expansion, economic development, and 
transportation networks. Of more importance, such joint programs 
would increase and more effectively use available federal funds. More 
and more the federal government is promoting interstate regional 
planning and development. The Appalachia economic bills are one 
example, as are the proposed federal programs in commuter transpor-
§14.37. 1 Acts of 1965. c. 389. 
2Id .• c. 145. 
3 Id .• c. 178. 
4 Senate No. 769 (1965). 
15 House No. 1888 (1965). 
6 House No. 3666 (1965). 
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tation. As of the date of writing the Governor's bill has not been acted 
upon. 
§14.38. Building and safety regulations. In O'Donnell v. Board 
of Appeals of Billerica1 a builder sought permission to build homes 
without cellars although they were required by the local building code. 
Under the by-law the local Board of Appeals could grant relief from 
the provisions of the code upon proper showing. In this case the Board 
granted the variation sought. The petitioners, nearby landowners, 
sought review of this decision by a writ of certiorari. The dismissal of 
the writ by the Superior Court was sustained on appeal. 
The petitioners sought to have the Court apply General Laws, 
Chapter 40A, Sections 14 and 17. These sections of the zoning en-
abling act require notice to be given of the hearings of the board of 
appeals. The Supreme Judicial Court held Chapter 40A inapplicable 
to building code cases. It also refused to follow the analogy to the 
zoning procedures, noting that the Board in the present case was not 
hearing an appeal but was acting as the public representative making 
the original determination. The Court did not decide, since it was 
irrelevant, whether notice would be required in a case in which the 
Board was actually reviewing the grant or denial of a permit by an-
other administrator. The Board in this case was not acting as a 
tribunal performing a judicial function but was merely the administra-
tor, and so certiorari would not lie. 
The Court noted that the Federal and State Constitutions and state 
statutes do not require a hearing on the issuance of building permits 
and that the petitioners could show no special injury that might sug-
gest they should have a means of directly attacking the grant. Man-
damus proceedings are available to insure that enforcing officers act 
under the building codes but no such officer was even a party to this 
proceeding. 
The Court finally stated that, had the judge below had jurisdiction, 
his denial of the writ on discretionary grounds would not have been 
erroneous. It was then pointed out that the writ of mandamus is also 
discretionary, the Court by footnote detailing some of the issues that 
would be pertinent if this writ were brought. 
When the grant of a building permit involves only the safety and 
health of the locus, public policy, as the Court indicated, does not 
require general public hearings and notice. The grantor of the permit 
represents the public interest and can insure that those factors of 
direct interest to the public are completely considered. It may be that 
adjoining property owners might feel their properties would be some-
what decreased in value if new homes are built on slabs rather than 
over basements. But, beyond the uncertainty of this premise itself, 
building codes should not be used primarily to preserve property 
values, although a number of communities use these codes to limit new 
building. 
§14.!l8. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 919, 207 N.E.2d 877. See also §14.6 supra. 
39
D'Agostine and Huber: Chapter 14: Land Use Planning Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1965
§14.39 LAND USE PLANNING LAW 223 
§14.39. Tidelands and wetlands.1 Chapter 220 of the Acts of 1965, 
enacted during the 19~5 SURVEY year, amended General Laws, Chap-
ter 131, by adding a new Section 117C. Written notice must now be 
given to the board of selectmen in a town or the mayor of a city, and to 
the state Departments of Public Works and Natural Resources, if a 
person intends to remove, fill, or dredge any bank, flat, marsh, meadow, 
or swamp bordering on any inland waters. The notice must be sent 
at least thirty days prior to any removing, filling, or dredging. A 
public hearing must then be held within ten days of receipt of said 
notice. The person intending to do the work will be notified of the 
time and place of the hearing. Flood plain zones designated by the 
Water Resources Commission, land used for agricultural purposes, 
mosquito control projects, and Chapter 252 projects for improvement 
of lowlands and swamps are exempt from the new statute. The Com-
missioner of Natural Resources may also exempt land from this statute 
under certain standards. 
Chapter 375 of the Acts of 1965 was also adopted during the 1965 
SURVEY year. It amended General Laws, Chapter 130, Section 27 (A), 
so as to now require publication, in addition to written notices, on 
hearings relative to removal, filling, and dredging in areas bordering 
on the coastal waters. In Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. 
Volpe &- CO.J2 discussed in detail elsewhere, the Supreme Judicial Court 
determined that a restriction on use of wetlands would constitute a 
taking and not just a regulation, if it deprives an owner of any reason-
able use of his land. 
Also, during the 1965 SURVEY year, a resolve was sent to the Gov-
ernor authorizing the Department of Natural Resources to make an 
investigation and study of House Bill No. 1916, which calls for the 
creation of at least one public shore reservation in every city and town 
in which there is a tidal shore. 
§14.39. 1 See also discussion in §14.23 supra of coastal wetlands legislation. 
21965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 671, 206 N.E.2d 666, noted in §14.23 supra. 
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